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Abstract
As the nation’s Catholic universities and colleges continually clarify their identity, 
this article examines academic freedom in classroom speech, offering a heuristic 
model for use as board members, academic administrators, and faculty leaders 
discuss, evaluate, and judge allegations of misconduct in classroom speech.
Focusing upon the practice of academic freedom in classroom speech, this article 
aims to map this contested terrain for board members, academic administra-
tors, and faculty leaders in U.S. Catholic higher education. More substantively, 
this article identifi es what forms of classroom speech are allowed and disal-
lowed, and why this is so.
Identifying the Terrain: Institutional Religious Mission 
and Academic Freedom
In the decades following Vatican II, the interface of institutional 
mission and academic freedom has fi gured prominently in debate at all 
levels of U.S. Catholic higher education. What this debate has clarifi ed 
are two very different understandings of institutional mission and defi -
nitions of academic freedom.
In April 1967, the University of Notre Dame (UND) hosted a sym-
posium, “Academic Freedom and the Catholic University.” At this con-
ference, Philip Gleason called academic freedom “the most crucial problem 
facing Catholic higher education.”1 John Walsh asserted that it was 
erroneous to speak of a Catholic university “as part of the teaching 
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1 Philip Gleason, “Academic Freedom and the Crisis in Catholic Universities,” in Aca-
demic Freedom and the Catholic University, eds. Edward Manier and John W. Houck 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), 53. 
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function of the Roman Catholic Church or even its teaching apostolate,” 
arguing that a Catholic university must stand apart from and not be 
controlled by the Church because a Catholic university is “perhaps the 
highest formal, explicit, and systematic manifestation—of the Church 
learning.”2 John McKenzie proposed that academic freedom should be 
without qualifi cation because “the principle of censorship is basically 
irrational and immoral.”3 He added: “Censorship settles scholarly differ-
ences of opinion by a moral bludgeon. And censorship is totally unneces-
sary, because scholarship is equipped to do better what censorship 
pretends to do….”4
Commensurate with Pope John XXIII’s call for “aggiornamento,” 
most speakers advocated greater autonomy and independence from 
the Church. They argued this would liberate U.S. Catholic higher 
education from its parochial past so that it could achieve greater 
prominence among its public and private counterparts. What these 
speakers emphasized was the public mission of higher education, 
namely, the unfettered pursuit of truth wherever the evidence may 
lead. What they hoped to renew—or for some, like Walsh and McKenzie, 
to eschew—was a more sectarian understanding of the religious mis-
sion of Catholic higher education, namely, the unencumbered pursuit 
of truth in fi delity to the Church and its teaching. In retrospect, the 
speakers raised an issue that would be the subject of much debate in 
the next fi ve decades: the interface of institutional mission and aca-
demic freedom.
Twenty-three years later, Pope John Paul II promulgated Ex corde 
Ecclesiae, an apostolic constitution directly addressing the fi rst mat-
ter, the character (or “identity”) of Catholic higher education. John 
Paul II asserted that continuous renewal “requires a clear awareness 
that, by its Catholic character, a University is made more capable of 
conducting an impartial search for truth, a search that is neither sub-
ordinated to nor conditioned by particular interests of any kind.”5 
Later in the document, he clarifi ed the meaning of the term “impartial,” 
2 John E. Walsh, “The University and the Church,” in Academic Freedom and the 
Catholic University, 109. 
3 John L. McKenzie, “The Freedom of the Priest-Scholar,” in Academic Freedom and 
the Catholic University, 172. 
4 Ibid., 173. 
5 Pope John Paul II, “Apostolic Constitution: Ex corde Ecclesiae” (http://www.vatican.
va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_constitutions/documents/hf_jp-ii_apc_15081990_
ex-corde-ecclesiae_en.html. (accessed December 12, 2009), sec 7, ¶2. 
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which has implications for those teaching in Catholic universities and 
colleges:
One consequence of its essential relationship to the Church is that the institu-
tional fi delity of the University to the Christian message includes a recognition 
of and adherence to the teaching authority of the Church in matters of faith 
and morals. Catholic members of the university community are also called to 
a personal fi delity to the Church with all that this implies. Non-Catholic mem-
bers are required to respect the Catholic character of the University, while the 
University in turn respects their religious liberty.6 
John Paul II then specifi ed four “essential characteristics” that identify 
a Catholic university, making it clear that greater institutional fi delity 
to its religious mission was required.7 
Addressing the nation’s Catholic educators in 2008, Pope Benedict 
XVI discussed the second matter, academic freedom, stating:
In virtue of this freedom[,] you are called to search for the truth wherever 
careful analysis of evidence leads you. Yet it is also the case that any appeal to 
the principle of academic freedom in order to justify positions that contradict 
the faith and the teaching of the Church would obstruct or even betray the 
university’s identity and mission, a mission at the heart of the Church’s munus 
docendi and not somehow autonomous or independent of it.8 
While neither pope denied the principle of academic freedom that 
is essential to the public mission of higher education, both have insisted 
that renewal of U.S. Catholic higher education requires bringing into a 
more appropriate balance the public and religious mission of U.S. Cath-
olic higher education. The emphasis in this era, both popes maintained, 
is its religious mission.
In this debate, what both sides have steadfastly advocated—each 
believing its defi nition and understanding of academic freedom thor-
oughly orthodox—clarifi es the terrain where institutional mission and 
academic freedom interface in U.S. Catholic higher education. Arguably, 
nowhere is this terrain more likely to be contested than when a professor 
is alleged to have ventured beyond the boundaries of classroom 
speech that academic freedom protects.
6 Pope John Paul II, Ex corde Ecclesiae, sec 3, ¶27. 
7 Pope John Paul II, Ex corde Ecclesiae, Part I:A, sec 1, ¶13. 
8 Benedict XVI, “Meeting with Catholic Educators: Address of His Holiness Pope Bene-
dict XVI,” http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2008/april/documents/
hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080417_cath-univ-washington_en.html (accessed March 15, 2010), ¶16. 
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Two Cases: Clarifying Academic Freedom in Classroom Speech
Adjudicating what constitutes a violation of academic freedom in 
classroom speech is a complicated endeavor. One must evaluate not only 
a professor’s words and intentions but also how students and other 
stakeholders interpret those words and intentions. The following two 
cases clarify the boundaries demarcating the terrain of classroom speech 
in the nation’s Catholic universities and colleges.
Case 1: Donald Hindley’s Reprimand
Professor Donald Hindley had taught political science for nearly 
fi ve decades at Brandeis University (BU), a nonsectarian, Jewish-
sponsored, private, research university. In the fall of 2007, at least one 
student accused Hindley of uttering “inappropriate and racially de-
rogatory statements.” The allegation stemmed from Hindley’s course 
in Latin American history and his use of the term “wetback.” If true, 
Hindley’s classroom speech violated BU’s nondiscrimination and 
harassment policy, and the professor would be subject to various 
sanctions.9 
A student brought her accusation to BU’s Provost, Marty Krauss, 
who forwarded it to the Director of Employment, Jesse Simone. 
Although BU’s policy directs administrators to attempt to mediate such 
confl icts, Simone initiated an investigation and, on October 22, inter-
viewed Hindley without alerting him to the nature of the complaint. 
The next day and without having fi rst offered Hindley an opportunity to 
make comments and clarifi cations as guaranteed by BU’s policy, Simone 
submitted a report to Krauss.
On October 30, Simone informed Hindley of her verdict: his con-
duct violated BU’s policy.10 That same day, Krauss sent Hindley a letter 
notifying him that she would apply two sanctions for his “inappropri-
ate, racial and discriminatory conduct....” An Assistant Provost would 
“monitor” Hindley’s classroom for an indefi nite, but temporary, period 
9 Andy Guess, “Sending in the Class Monitor,” Inside Higher Education, http://www.
insidehighered.com/news/2007/11/09/brandeis. (accessed December 4, 2008); Andy Guess, 
“Harassment vs. Academic Freedom: Round Two,” Inside Higher Education, http://www.
insidehighered.com/news/2008/01/24/brandeis. (accessed January 25, 2009). 
10 Jesse Simone, “Letter to Professor David Hindley,” Foundation for Individual 
Rights in Education, http://www.thefi re.org/pdfs/c2dd5effe39ca1444f7df643382f3c38.pdf. 
(accessed October 30, 2009). 
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of time until Krauss determined Hindley was “able to conduct [him-
self ] appropriately in the classroom.” She also required Hindley to at-
tend sensitivity training. Failure to correct his conduct, Krauss warned, 
“may result in further disciplinary action up to, and including, 
termination.”11 
Hindley claimed that he had invoked the term in the context of 
explaining its historical usage. Hindley complicated matters, however, 
by reading Simone’s and Krauss’ letters to his class. This led approxi-
mately one-third of the class to stage a walkout to protest the profes-
sor’s treatment. Hindley also scanned Krauss’ letter and emailed it to a 
listserve.12 
Following Hindley’s appeal of Krauss’ decision to the Faculty Sen-
ate, the dispute escalated. Meeting in an emergency session on Novem-
ber 8, the Faculty Senate unanimously asserted that its members were 
“seriously concerned” about procedural problems.13 The Committee on 
Faculty Rights and Responsibilities (CFRR) accepted Hindley’s appeal 
and wrote the Provost on November 29, calling for a reversal and citing 
threats to academic freedom, procedural irregularities, and excessive 
punishments. CFRR also ruled that the Provost’s “actions to date pose a 
threat to…academic freedom…a matter on which we retain an active 
interest.”14 
On December 10, Krauss rejected CFRR’s ruling, referring to “er-
rors, both factual and legal.”15 She also asserted that accepting CFRR’s 
recommendations “would undermine the community’s faith in the in-
tegrity of the University’s policies; chill future students, faculty, and 
staff from coming forward with complaints; place the University at sig-
nifi cant risk of violating state and federal law; and potentially lead to 
retaliation against those individuals who have the courage to speak 
out against discrimination.” The Provost was adamant concerning the 
11 Marty W. Krauss, “Letter to Professor David Hindley,” http://thefi re.org/pdfs/4bb78
01320fb0fbecb4734c2cf1e4a09.pdf.(accessed April 15, 2009). 
12 David Pepose, “Politics Professor Accused of Making Racist Remarks,” The Bran-
deis Hoot, http://thehoot.net/articles/2054. (accessed April 13, 2009). 
13 Brandeis University Faculty Senate, “Minutes of Fourth Meeting,” http://thefi re.
org/pdfs/8e00d6c4705a5e04ec7c5677507052a8.pdf. (accessed April 16, 2009). 
14 Committee on Faculty Rights and Responsibilities, “A Ruling from the Commit-
tee on Faculty Rights and Responsibilities: Appeal by Professor David Hindley,” http://
www.thefi re.org/public/pdfs/be2e57b7b537a256b5e1b8a6d0a00141.pdf?direct. (accessed 
April 21, 2009). 
15 Andy Guess, “Harassment vs. Academic Freedom.” 
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offended students’ legal rights to anonymity. Lastly, Krauss defended 
Simone’s investigation.16 
That same day, CFRR issued a memo to the Faculty Senate chiding 
Krauss for violating Hindley’s academic freedom as well as the threat 
this posed to “other faculty and students at Brandeis.”17 Responding to 
the memo, the Faculty Senate sent a letter to BU’s President two days 
later. Concerning the reappointment of Krauss as Provost, the letter 
stated: “Several faculty reported a ‘chilling atmosphere’ concerning free 
speech of faculty throughout the campus and some untenured faculty 
members are afraid to speak their minds candidly and forthrightly.”18 
On December 17, CFRR ruled on “the remaining issues of academic 
freedom and ‘fair and equitable treatment’ in the application of uni-
versity policies.” Suggesting the Provost’s actions were based upon a 
“polarizing theory” that “treats academic freedom as encroaching on 
policies for preventing discriminatory treatment—or vice versa,” CFRR 
maintained that BU’s policy was written to promote academic free-
dom and nondiscrimination “without dilution.” The sanctions applied, 
especially inserting the monitor into Hindley’s classroom, violated the 
policy, as “the inevitable function of the monitor as censor…[can] alter 
the dynamics of a classroom, inhibiting faculty and students alike.”19 
After issuing three letters, CFRR requested the Provost to rescind 
her decision, accused BU’s administrators of abusing the policy as well 
as their own power with the goal of punishing Hindley, and asserted 
that BU’s administrators had denied Hindley his rights to fair treat-
ment and academic freedom. In its December 19 letter, CFRR stated: “It 
is a curious feature of the faculty dispute resolution process that the 
16 Noah Bein, “Provost Rejects Ruling: A Committee’s Memo Asserting Prof. David 
Hindley’s Innocence was Deemed Inaccurate,” The Justice Online.com, http://media.
www.thejusticeonline.com/media/storage/paper573/news/2008/01/15/News/Provost.
Rejects.Ruling-3152660.shtml. (accessed April 21, 2009). 
17 Committee on Faculty Rights and Responsibilities, “Brettler Memo to Faculty 
Senate,” http://www.thefi re.org/pdfs/21bcc5919e54a2e65098071a74af8571.pdf. (accessed 
April 16, 2009). 
18 Adam Kissel, “Letter to President Jehuda Reinharz,” http://thefi re.org/pdfs/30ebf20
 be60ac4b81980853f4c93f2ea.pdf. (May 10, 2009). 
19 Committee on Faculty Rights and Responsibilities, “A Supplementary Ruling from 
the Committee on Faculty Rights and Responsibilities: Appeal by Professor David 
Hindley,” http://www.thefi re.org/pdfs/00bcccd95d06617733c57659906b82bf.pdf. (accessed 
April 16, 2009). 
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Provost, in cases of this sort, essentially becomes the fi nal judge of her 
own actions.”20 
Meanwhile, Hindley had contacted The Foundation for Individual 
Rights in Education. The Director of its Individual Rights Defense Pro-
gram, Adam Kissel, wrote BU’s President on December 12: “If Brandeis 
is to legitimately claim to provide a liberal education, it cannot priori-
tize individual sensitivities over protecting the freedom of speech and 
academic freedom of its professors. Guarantees of liberty, such as those 
found in the canons of academic freedom and in Brandeis’s own policies, 
are meaningless if they are jettisoned as soon as they become 
unpopular.”21 BU’s President did not respond.
There was no hearing or apology. However, on January 7, 2008, 
BU’s Provost sent Hindley a letter stating: “The University now con-
siders this matter closed.”22 Hindley responded, stating that the letter 
came “out of the blue” and “needs considerable thought as to how to re-
ply to it, and I have not yet made up my mind.”23 
Despite Krauss’ assertion to the contrary, the matter was far from 
“closed.” On January 31, the Faculty Senate suspended its support of the 
nondiscrimination and harassment policy.24 CFRR continued to critique 
the administration and, on March 6, extended its criticism, citing a 
“breakdown,” and reported that CFRR had “deferred the review of faculty 
grievances pending a clear reaffi rmation by the Faculty Senate and by 
the administration of shared principles of faculty governance.” One week 
later, the Faculty Senate passed additional unanimous resolutions object-
ing to the Provost’s actions. Krauss responded on April 10, invoking “spe-
cifi c legal responsibilities” in Hindley’s case, yet did not explain what they 
were.25 The Faculty Senate passed another resolution on May 1, reaffi rm-
ing CFRR’s fi ndings, including the judgment that Krauss had “violated 
Professor Hindley’s faculty rights, including the right to academic free-
dom and the right to be treated fairly under University policies.”26 
Although the confl icts between BU’s faculty and the Provost went 
unresolved, Hindley’s case required determining which is of greater 
20 Bein, “Provost Rejects Ruling.” 
21 Kissel, “Letter to President.” 
22 Marty W. Krauss, “Letter to Faculty Colleagues,” http://www.thefi re.org/pdfs/
e5d8217c3641324d532ec36029144519.pdf. (accessed April 15, 2009). 
23 Bein, “Provost Rejects Ruling.” 
24 Kissel, “Letter to President.” 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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importance: protecting a professor’s academic freedom in classroom 
speech or ensuring that students will come forward when they believe 
professors have used harassing language.27 Hindley’s classroom speech 
proved crucial in the Provost’s determination and application of sanc-
tions. Judged guilty for subjecting students to discriminatory and ha-
rassing speech, the question is whether academic freedom—intended to 
protect professors in fulfi lling the public mission of U.S. higher educa-
tion, namely, the unfettered pursuit of truth wherever the evidence may 
lead—protects such speech in classrooms.
To arrive at this conclusion, academic freedom must be defi ned in 
such a way that its boundaries are narrowed to disallow classroom 
speech that might be deemed discriminatory or harassing, thus restrict-
ing classroom speech to statements and phrases that will not be taken 
out of context. Yet, professors oftentimes will use such speech to chal-
lenge students to think ideas through to reasoned conclusions, to broaden 
intellectual perspectives, and to form hypotheses that can be critically 
scrutinized in a public forum like classrooms.
If classroom speech is restricted, would that not do a disservice 
to the public mission of U.S. higher education as well as to students 
and their intellectual formation by limiting the language used in 
classrooms to vocabulary specifi c to the discipline being studied? 
This narrowing of boundaries makes it less probable that students 
will encounter professors who engage their classes in the dispassion-
ate and unfettered search for truth. The sanctions imposed on Hindley 
served notice that classroom speech is restricted: discriminatory or 
harassing language that engenders a hostile learning environment 
is not protected. There is a boundary beyond which academic free-
dom does not protect classroom speech.
Although Hindley’s case was adjudicated at a private university, 
it provides two standards concerning the practice of academic freedom 
in classroom speech for U.S. Catholic higher education. First, academic 
freedom does not protect discriminatory or harassing classroom speech 
that engenders a hostile learning environment. The unfettered pursuit 
of truth does not allow for beliefs, generalizations, prejudices, and the 
like to be asserted as fact and go unchallenged. Second, the criteria used 
to judge Hindley can be expanded to include discriminatory or harass-
ing speech directed at the faith or teaching of the Church which engen-
ders a hostile learning environment. This latter standard is likely to 
27 Guess, “Harassment vs. Academic Freedom.” 
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generate controversy in U.S. Catholic higher education, especially 
among those who believe that the practice of academic freedom in class-
room speech is unrestricted.
Pope Benedict XVI has addressed this tension and its potential for 
controversy, indicating that the unfettered pursuit of truth does not allow 
for beliefs, generalizations, prejudices, and the like concerning the faith 
or teaching of the Church to be stated as fact and go unchallenged:
In regard to faculty members at Catholic colleges [and] universities, I wish to 
reaffi rm the great value of academic freedom. In virtue of this freedom, you are 
called to search for the truth wherever careful analysis of evidence leads you. 
Yet it is also the case that any appeal to the principle of academic freedom in 
order to justify positions that contradict the faith and teaching of the Church 
would obstruct or even betray the university’s identity and mission.28 
Case 2: Charles Curran’s Firing
Along with U.S. public and private higher education, Catholic higher 
education shares a public mission. Catholic higher education differs 
in that it also has a religious mission, which inspires and informs its 
identity. It is this latter mission that some constituents will use to jus-
tify allegations that professors have violated the practice of academic 
freedom in classroom speech.
To date, the most publicized case in U.S. Catholic higher education 
involved Charles Curran. His mortal sin? In his publications, Curran 
dared to disagree openly with offi cial Church teaching concerning 
sexual ethics. His speculations raised the eyebrows of Vatican offi cials 
at the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) as early as 
1968. Eleven years later, Curran received a sixteen-page list detailing 
his “principal errors and ambiguities.”29 Then, in 1986, CDF declared 
Curran “neither suitable nor eligible to teach Catholic theology.”30 A 
tenured professor at the Catholic University of America (CUA), Curran 
was subsequently fi red by its board, silencing his voice inside of CUA 
classrooms.
28 Benedict XVI, “Meeting with Catholic Educators,” ¶16. 
29 Charles Curran, Loyal Dissent: Memoir of a Catholic Theologian (Washington: 
Georgetown University Press, 2006), 107. 
30 Peter Steinfels, “Compromise Sought at Catholic U on Teacher Censored by Vati-
can,” New York Times, April 8, 1988, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940-
DE2DB133EF93BA35757C0A96E948260. (accessed April 29, 2009). 
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On the assumption that Curran taught students about his pub-
lished speculations, what lessons might the board’s action suggest about 
those forms of classroom speech that academic freedom does and does 
not protect vis-à-vis the religious mission of Catholic higher educa-
tion?
Consider the teaching of theology, an academic discipline that is 
singularly important, if not central, to the religious mission of Catholic 
higher education. Some stakeholders are vociferous in asserting that 
academic administrators, as well as diocesan and Vatican offi cials, pos-
sess the right to dismiss theologians whose conclusions contradict 
Church teaching, especially when this transpires in classrooms. Liken-
ing these institutions to local franchises of a multinational corporation, 
those who espouse this view expect professors teaching theology to “pro-
mote and safeguard” Church teaching. Others believe theologians 
should be “licensed” to teach.
When theologians present only the faith or teaching of the Church 
and do not subject both to critical scrutiny inside of classrooms, does 
this not smack of indoctrination rather than the “joy of searching for, 
discovering, and communicating truth in every fi eld of knowledge,” what 
John Paul II called the “privileged task” of the Catholic university or 
college?31 Should students—and all stakeholders as well—not fully ex-
pect professors teaching theology to subject the faith and teaching of 
the Church to objective, if not critical, scrutiny? With respect to U.S. 
Catholic higher education in general, how would Catholic theology 
progress if theologians—like Curran—are not free to speak in their 
classrooms about what advances in sciences and culture may portend 
for Church teaching?
These are substantive questions for theologians, but Pope Benedict 
XVI has expanded these questions to include all who teach in Catholic 
higher education, noting:
Clearly, then, Catholic identity is not dependent upon statistics. Neither can it 
be equated simply with orthodoxy of course content. It demands and inspires 
much more: namely that each and every aspect of your learning communities 
reverberates within the ecclesial life of faith. Only in faith can truth become 
incarnate and reason truly human, capable of directing the will along the path 
of freedom.32 
31 Pope John Paul II, Ex corde Ecclesiae, Introduction, ¶1. 
32 Benedict XVI, “Meeting with Catholic Educators,” ¶10. 
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Each Catholic university and college has a public mission—to provide a 
forum wherein professors and students freely pursue the truth—as well 
as a religious mission—the unfettered pursuit of truth in fi delity to the 
Church and its teaching—and is asked to fulfi ll these missions “in the 
context of the impartial search for truth, that the relationship between 
faith and reason is brought to light and meaning.”33 
Curran’s fi ring served notice of a second standard that directly im-
pacts classroom speech in U.S. Catholic higher education: professors 
may not subject students, as CDF would argue, to “opinions that seem 
to be contrary or dangerous” while allowing for no rebuttal. Later clari-
fi cations by John Paul II and Benedict XVI suggest that the religious 
mission of an institution of Catholic higher education provides justifi ca-
tion to widen scrutiny of alleged misconduct to include a professor’s 
classroom speech.
Curran’s case provides two standards concerning the practice of 
academic freedom in classroom speech for U.S. Catholic higher educa-
tion. First, academic freedom does not protect classroom speech which 
promotes any ideology—even an institution’s religious mission—if pro-
fessors do not situate that ideology within the broader context of their 
disciplinary knowledge. Second, the practice of academic freedom in 
classroom speech in U.S. Catholic higher education is restricted in that 
any speech that would either seek to impose or to deny or ridicule an 
institution’s religious mission violates academic freedom. This latter 
standard is likely to generate controversy among stakeholders, especially 
those who want to guard against classroom speech they believe would 
contradict or seek to diminish an institution’s Catholic identity.
Since the practice of academic freedom in classroom speech is re-
stricted, where is the line to be drawn? In the Curran case, CUA’s 
board did not yield to Curran and his supporters. Consequently, the 
boundary demarcating what classroom speech is and is not protected 
in U.S. Catholic higher education is a bit clearer. However, the board’s 
decision did not put an end to the skirmishing at CUA or other Catholic 
universities and colleges. Those professing unrestricted freedom of 
speech in classrooms continue to battle their opponents with the goal 
that their cherished defi nition of academic freedom will ultimately 
prevail.
33 Benedict XVI, “Meeting with Catholic Educators,” ¶1. 
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A Heuristic Model: Situating the Practice of Academic 
Freedom in Classroom Speech
Hindley’s and Curran’s supporters are adamant: both professors were 
denied the protections afforded by academic freedom. Using a “without 
dilution” standard to defi ne orthodox practice, these supporters root their 
defi nition in political philosophy, as John Stuart Mill described speech in 
On Liberty,34 as well as in First Amendment political guarantees, specif-
ically the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Keyishian v. Board of Regents.35
This defense of unrestricted academic freedom presents three prob-
lems. First, even Mill restricted some speech to avoid the tyranny of the 
majority,36 as did the U.S. Supreme Court in Schenck v. United States, 
when the Court asserted that citizens are free to say anything except to 
shout “Fire!” falsely—a metaphor for “the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present 
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils.”37
Second, this defense fails to account for Brandenburg v. Ohio which 
overturned Schenck, the Court’s majority arguing that only speech di-
rected to and likely to incite imminent lawless action can be banned.38 
Since Brandenburg, courts have construed “shouting ‘Fire!’ in a crowded 
theater” to mean “reckless or malicious speech or actions whose injuri-
ous outcomes are blatantly obvious.” If the interpretations and compet-
ing ideas exchanged in classrooms are stated in reckless or malicious 
ways or involve actions whose injurious outcomes are blatantly obvious—
does either Hindley’s use of the word “wetback” or Curran’s dissent from 
Church teaching qualify?—then academic freedom does not protect such 
speech.
Third, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) 
has acknowledged a post-Brandenburg boundary: harassing and dis-
criminatory speech or speech that engenders a hostile learning environ-
ment is prohibited.39
34 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/jsmill-lib.html. 
I:13 (accessed May 29, 2009).  
35 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, (1967). 
36 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/jsmill-lib.html. 
I:6. 
37 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, (1919).
38 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969).
39 American Association of University Professors, “Freedom in the Classroom,” http://
www.aaup.org/AAUP/comm/rep/A/class.htm. II.B.2 (accessed October 25, 2008).
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For the purpose of formulating a heuristic model that maps the 
terrain associated with the practice of academic freedom in classroom 
speech, consider how the public mission of a Catholic university or col-
lege can be used to disallow any harassing and discriminatory speech 
directed at the faith or teaching of the Church as well as speech that 
engenders a hostile learning environment. Let’s call this terrain “Ideology-
PM.” That is, there exists a boundary beyond which academic freedom 
does not protect these forms of classroom speech because beliefs, gener-
alizations, prejudices, and the like cannot be asserted as fact and go 
unchallenged. Those who desire to restrict speech in U.S. Catholic higher 
education protest an Ideology-PM defi nition of academic freedom, 
believing that the public mission of U.S. Catholic higher education does 
not protect some speech. In this, they are correct.
Consider also how the religious mission of a Catholic university or 
college can be invoked to disallow any classroom speech directed at the 
faith or teaching of the Church. Let’s call this terrain “Ideology-RM.” 
That is, a boundary exists beyond which academic freedom does not 
protect these forms of classroom speech because they threaten to dilute 
or diminish the institution’s religious mission. Those who reference the 
Keyishian decision and those who support Charles Curran protest an 
Ideology-RM defi nition of academic freedom, fi rm in the belief that it 
casts “a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.” In this, they are correct 
because this ideology would not allow professors to question the institu-
tion’s religious mission in light of the “new questions arising from the 
progress of the sciences or human culture.”40 
This distinction between “Ideology-PM” and “Ideology-RM” defi ni-
tions of academic freedom is hardly novel. Marsden traces the Ideology-
PM defi nition to the emergence of intellectualism in the nineteenth 
century, largely in reaction to the control exercised by clergymen—and, in 
the United States, Protestant clergymen—who imposed and enforced their 
orthodox Ideology-RM defi nition upon professors.41 Ironically, the then 
heterodox embraced the scientifi c method and its positivistic empiricism. 
Imbued with the same religious zeal they decried in the then orthodox,42 
40 Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Constitution: Pastor Bonus, http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_constitutions/documents/hf_jp-ii_apc_19880628_pastor-
 bonus-index_en.html. (accessed October 15, 2008), Article 49. 
41 George Marsden, The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establish-
ment to Established Nonbelief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
42 Gleason, “Academic Freedom,” 49. See also: Edward Shils, “The Intellectuals and 
the Powers: Some Perspectives for Comparative Analysis,” Comparative Studies in So-
ciety and History, 1:1 (1958), 16-17. 
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the heterodox rooted their defi nition in the moral belief that all speech is 
unrestricted.43 The Ideology-RM defi nition can be traced at least as far 
back as the emergence of the medieval universities, although theologians 
have used this defi nition from Christianity’s earliest years to defend their 
heterodox speculations.44 Those holding this defi nition have rooted it in 
the moral belief that Church teaching proscribes certain forms of speech.
To map this terrain, let’s consider two Catholic colleges, Wyoming 
Catholic College (WCC) and the now-closed Southern Catholic College 
(SCC), and what they require of professors. Using the AAUP’s defi nition 
as the standard of assessment, while both are Catholic institutions of 
higher education, their policies governing the practice of academic free-
dom in classroom speech could not differ more.
At WCC, “Catholic members of the faculty will voluntarily make a 
public Profession of Faith and take the Oath of Fidelity…in the presence 
of the Ordinary of the Diocese of Cheyenne or his representative.”45 
Perhaps not surprisingly, in light of Vatican and United States Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops attempts since the early 1990s to rein in theo-
logians in Catholic universities and colleges by mandating that they 
swear allegiance to Church teaching,46 the public profession and 
oath also targets Catholic faculty in other disciplines. At WCC, all 
Catholic professors must voluntarily accede to Church teaching and 
papal authority, even in the event that one’s subject identifi es “new 
questions arising from the progress of the sciences or human 
culture.”47 The purpose is that WCC “meet rigorous standards of being 
truly Catholic,” according to its President, Rev. Robert W. Cook.48 
This requirement maps the terrain lying beyond the boundary 
erected by an Ideology-RM defi nition of academic freedom. Were a Catholic 
43 Gleason, “Academic Freedom,” 53. 
44 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doc-
trine, Vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). 
45 Wyoming Catholic College, “Profession of Faith: Faculty Profession of Faith and 
Oath of Fidelity,” http://www.wyomingcatholiccollege.com/tabid/112/Default.aspx. (ac-
cessed December 2, 2008). 
46 Pope John Paul II, Ex corde Ecclesiae; United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 
(2001), “Guidelines concerning the academic mandatum in Catholic universities 
(Canon 812),” http://www.usccb.org/bishops/mandatumguidelines.shtml. (accessed May 
17, 2009). 
47 Pope John Paul II, Pastor Bonus, Article 49. 
48 Elizabeth Redden, “Catholic Character,” Inside Higher Education, September 25, 
2007, http://www.insidehighered.com/layout/set/dialog/news/2007/09/25/catholic. (ac-
cessed December 2, 2008). 
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professor to opine during class concerning his or her heterodox views, 
WCC’s requirement would fully justify a student to fi le charges al-
leging professorial misconduct in classroom speech. If the allegation 
were proven, a Catholic professor would have violated the public pro-
fession and oath and could be subject to sanctions, including possible 
dismissal.
Southern Catholic College (SCC) did not require a public profes-
sion and oath. Yet, its President, Jeremiah J. Ashcroft, also asserted 
that his institution was “truly Catholic.” To uphold this standard, 
applicants for teaching positions were informed during the hiring 
process of the expectation that they were to respect the faith and 
teaching of the Church which, for Ashcroft, meant faculty were 
encouraged to allow classroom discussion on all sides of a cultural 
debate.49 
Although less restrictive, SCC’s requirement identifi ed the bound-
ary erected by an Ideology-RM defi nition of academic freedom which 
demarcates classroom speech that is and is not protected. At SCC, pro-
fessors could espouse their heterodox views during class as long as they 
were respectful of the faith and Church teaching. Were a student to believe 
a professor was not being respectful, this requirement would fully 
justify that student to fi le charges alleging professorial misconduct 
in classroom speech. While it would be more diffi cult to prove an allega-
tion of misconduct, if an allegation were proven, the professor may be 
subject to sanctions, though probably not dismissal unless the professor 
continued to voice the prohibited speech.
The line of demarcation? Restricting classroom speech when the 
issue concerns the faith or teaching of the Church. The boundaries are 
clear at WCC: controversial issues are “driven and informed by the 
church’s position.” At SCC, the boundaries are more ambiguous: pro-
fessors determine what respect of the faith and Church teachings 
require.
The intersection of the public and religious missions of U.S. Catho-
lic higher education renders classroom speech restricted. For the na-
tion’s Catholic universities and colleges, the two barriers beyond which 
classroom speech is not protected—the terrain of Ideology-PM and Ide-
ology-RM—make it possible to map the spacious terrain of classroom 
speech that academic freedom protects (Fig. 1).
49 Ibid. 
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Figure 1. Situating classroom speech in U.S. Catholic higher education
Aware of the potential for the concept of academic freedom to be 
misinterpreted and used for purposes other than to safeguard the pub-
lic mission of U.S. higher education, the AAUP defi ned the practice of 
academic freedom in classroom speech in these words: “Teachers are 
entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but 
they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial 
matter which has no relation to their subject” (italics added).50 Its inter-
pretive comments specify the term “subject” to denote a professor’s dis-
cipline or area of inquiry. Accordingly, academic freedom in U.S. Catholic 
higher education protects classroom speech—even controversial speech 
that pushes right up to the boundaries of Ideology-PM or Ideology-RM. 
The AAUP notes: “The intent of this statement is not to discourage what 
is ‘controversial.’ Controversy is at the heart of the free academic inquiry 
that the entire statement is designed to foster. The passage serves to 
underscore the need for teachers to avoid persistently intruding mate-
rial which has no relation to their subject.”51 
Invoking this standard, BU’s Provost determined that Hindley’s 
classroom speech violated academic freedom because she deemed it dis-
criminatory and/or racially harassing. For venturing into the terrain of 
unrestricted speech, the Provost applied sanctions. Similar to Hindley, 
Charles Curran was judged guilty of violating academic freedom. Writing 
50 American Association of University Professors, “Statement of Principles,” ¶b.
51 American Association of University Professors, “Statement of Principles,” fn. 2. 
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about controversial matters that were directly related to his subject, 
Curran also ventured into the terrain of unrestricted speech because, 
in the CDF’s judgment, he wrote in a way that misrepresented the faith 
and teaching of the Church. Thus, CDF stripped Curran of the right to 
call himself a “Catholic” theologian. Then, invoking an Ideology-RM def-
inition of academic freedom to justify its decision to restrict classroom 
speech, CUA’s board fi red Curran, effectively silencing his voice in the 
institution’s classrooms.
What is the lesson for professors who teach in the nation’s Catholic 
universities and colleges? Despite what some—if not many—may be-
lieve, the practice of academic freedom in classroom speech is neither 
unrestricted—giving license to professors to state whatever they want 
in classrooms—or restricted—denying professors the right to subject 
the faith or teaching of the Church and an institution’s religious mis-
sion to intense scrutiny. Practiced within boundaries demarcated by an 
institution’s public and religious missions, academic freedom protects 
all classroom speech directed at seeking the truth wherever the evidence 
may lead. Professors do not violate academic freedom by introducing pro-
vocative, challenging, or dissenting ideas into classroom speech. Nor do 
professors violate academic freedom by introducing subjective beliefs, 
fi ctions, and deceptions into classroom speech. Both represent valid 
forms of classroom speech professors can use to get students to think 
and to do so critically. This is the stuff of intellectual formation that 
academic freedom is intended to protect.52 In contrast, professors vio-
late academic freedom when they “dogmatically insist on the truth of 
such propositions by refusing to accord their students the opportunity 
to contest them.” This is indoctrination and, as the AAUP notes, “The 
essence of higher education does not lie in the passive transmission of 
knowledge but in the inculcation of a mature independence of mind.”53 
Discussing, Evaluating, and Judging Allegations of 
Professorial Misconduct
The heuristic model (Fig. 1, p. 188) raises questions for board mem-
bers, academic administrators, and faculty leaders to answer as they dis-
cuss, evaluate, and judge an allegation that a professor’s classroom speech 
in a Catholic university or college has trespassed beyond the boundaries of 
protected speech. While this model will not make it possible for these 
52 American Association of University Professors, “Statement of Principles,” II.C.3. 
53 American Association of University Professors, “Statement of Principles,” II.A.3.¶7. 
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persons to settle every dispute, this model offers a prudent and princi-
pled pathway if and when these persons are called upon to judge an 
allegation.
Relative to a Catholic institution’s public mission, fi ve questions 
must be answered:
Is the classroom speech in question in fact unrelated to a professor’s 1. 
subject?54 
Is the speech reckless or malicious, or did it involve actions whose 2. 
injurious outcomes are blatantly obvious?55 
Is the speech harassing and discriminatory, or did it engender a hos-3. 
tile learning environment?56 
Has the classroom speech disallowed other points of view to be enter-4. 
tained, discussed, and critiqued?57 
If so, has this speech been persistent?5. 58 
Affi rmative answers to all of these questions justify the imposi-
tion of sanctions. Why? The lessons of the Hindley case provide one 
answer. Only when a professor acts on an Ideology-PM defi nition to 
introduce into classroom speech topics that are unrelated to one’s sub-
ject, uses harassing or discriminatory language, engages in actions 
whose injurious outcomes are blatantly obvious, engenders a hostile 
learning environment, persists in doing so, and, furthermore, does not 
allow other points of view to be introduced and evaluated fairly, the 
professor has engaged in classroom speech that is inimical to the pub-
lic mission of U.S. higher education. Statements made by other stu-
dents indicate that Hindley’s classroom speech failed to fulfi ll these 
fi ve requirements.
Relative to an institution’s religious mission, board members, 
academic administrators, and faculty leaders must also assess alle-
gations made about a professor’s classroom speech by asking fi ve 
questions:
54 American Association of University Professors, “Statement of Principles,” ¶b. 
55 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969); American Association of University 
Professors, “Statement of Principles, ¶b; American Association of University Professors, 
“Freedom in the Classroom,” II.B.2. 
56 American Association of University Professors, “Freedom in the Classroom,” II.B.2, C. 
57 American Association of University Professors, “Freedom in the Classroom,” II.A.4; 
Pope John Paul II, Ex corde Ecclesiae, ¶15. 
58 American Association of University Professors, “Freedom in the Classroom,” II.B.2; 
American Association of University Professors, “Statement of Principles,” fn. 2. 
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1. Are the institution’s religious mission or other aims clearly stated?59 
2. Were any restrictions upon academic freedom due to the institution’s 
religious mission or other aims clearly stated in writing at the time 
of the appointment?60 
3. Does the speech in question seek to impose or to deny or ridicule the 
institution’s religious mission or the faith and Church teaching?61 
4. Is the appeal to the principle of academic freedom justifying posi-
tions that contradict the faith and teaching of the Church in a way that 
would obstruct or even betray the university’s identity and mission?62 
5. Are favorable opinions of an institution’s religious mission or the 
faith and Church teaching belittled or dismissed without due 
consideration?63 
Affi rmative responses to all of these questions also justify the im-
position of sanctions. Why? Once again, the lessons of the Hindley case 
provide an answer. When a professor allows an Ideology-PM defi nition 
of academic freedom to introduce into classroom speech topics whose 
sole purpose is to impose or to deny or ridicule the institution’s religious 
mission and, furthermore, does not allow for a rebuttal, a professor has 
taken license with the rights afforded by academic freedom and not 
borne its concomitant responsibilities as these relate to classroom 
speech. The lessons of the Curran case also provide an answer. Academic 
freedom does not protect classroom speech that promotes any ideology—
even an institution’s religious mission—if professors do not situate that 
ideology within the broader context of their disciplinary knowledge.
What about stakeholders who hold an Ideology-RM defi nition of 
academic freedom—like alumni/ae or students—and want sanctions 
imposed upon a professor with whose classroom speech they happen to 
disagree? When misconduct is alleged, academic administrators and 
faculty leaders must fi rst establish the facts of the allegation.64 If the 
facts support the allegation, board members, academic administrators, 
and faculty leaders then must answer fi ve questions:
59 American Association of University Professors, “Statement of Principles,” ¶b. 
60 Ibid. 
61 American Association of University Professors, “Freedom in the Classroom,” II.B.6. 
62 Benedict XVI, “Meeting with Catholic Educators,” ¶16. 
63 American Association of University Professors, “Freedom in the Classroom,” II.B.2. 
64 This excludes second-hand or anecdotal information. Although these allegations 
should be investigated informally, they are not of suffi cient merit to warrant an offi cial 
inquiry. 
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1. Was the language used reckless, malicious, harassing, or discrim-
inatory?65 
2. Did the language engender a hostile learning environment?66 
3. Was the language accompanied by actions whose injurious outcomes 
are blatantly obvious?67 
4. Were other points of view belittled or rejected without due 
consideration?68 
5. Was the language used persistently?69 
Negative responses to all of these questions indicate that the indi-
vidual (or group) alleging misconduct is likely endeavoring to impose an 
Ideology-RM defi nition of academic freedom and, hence, to restrict class-
room speech. This obligates board members, academic administrators, 
and faculty leaders to dismiss such false allegations. These persons 
must also clear the professor of any and all charges as well as to re-
establish the professor’s good standing. Why? The lessons of the Curran 
case provide the answer. The practice of academic freedom in classroom 
speech in U.S. Catholic higher education encourages discussion and 
debate of all sides of an issue, as long as professors do not seek to 
impose or to deny or ridicule an institution’s religious mission or the 
faith or teaching of the Church.70 
It is incumbent upon board members, academic administrators, 
and faculty leaders to do all in their power to protect their institution’s 
public and religious purpose whenever it comes under assault by ideo-
logues. The practice of academic freedom in classroom speech is neither 
unrestricted—giving license to professors to state whatever they want 
in classrooms—or restricted—denying professors the right to subject 
the faith or teaching of the Church and an institution’s religious mis-
sion to intense scrutiny.
Professors, board members, academic administrators, faculty leaders, 
alumni/ae, students, and other stakeholders should fully expect that 
65 American Association of University Professors, “Freedom in the Classroom,” 
II.B.2. 
66 American Association of University Professors, “Statement of Principles,” #2. 
67 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, (1919). 
68 American Association of University Professors, “Freedom in the Classroom,” II.B.8; 
II:C.3. 
69 American Association of University Professors, “Statement of Principles,” #2. 
70 Pope John Paul II, “Ex corde Ecclesiae, sec 7, ¶2. 
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classroom speech in the nation’s Catholic universities and colleges 
provides students the very best possible intellectual and moral forma-
tion. Otherwise, the term “Catholic university,” as Bernard Shaw once 
noted, is a “contradiction in terms”71 and differences of opinion will likely 
be settled with “moral bludgeons,” as John McKenzie feared.72 
71 Bernard Shaw, Plays Unpleasant (New York: Penguin Books, 1953), 194. 
72 John L. McKenzie, “The Freedom of the Priest-Scholar,” 173. 

